Striving to maximise the welfare of any child born seems one of the most basic ethical duties we can have.  Thus, when it comes to reproduction that involves interventions by healthcare professionals, it is unsurprising that internationally law and policy in the area of reproductive choice has been hugely influenced by attempts to protect the welfare of future children.  For instance, many jurisdictions restrict access to fertility services on the basis of the welfare of the resultant child and others extend this concern about the welfare of the child to regulation to prohibit the implantation of ‘disabled’ IVF embryos if unaffected embryos are available.  But while these policies and regulations are internationally applied and have a great deal of support, finding a strong justification for these regulations and policies has been elusive.  

In this seminar I consider the question of why regulations based on the notion of the welfare of the child continue to have such a widespread and established place in many modern jurisdictions despite this lack of strong justification.  I argue that unconscious bias around disability, impairment and a notion of the ‘best’ child has meant that in our striving to protect future children we ask questions that, when more closely examined, do not fit these circumstances, do not protect the welfare of any future children and in fact damage the welfare of many existing individuals.  While this mistake may be unconscious and well-meaning, it is non-the-less damaging and goes against our general commitment to respecting the reproductive choices of individuals.