Working paper 01/034 - Abstract

Competition Policy and Agreements Between Firms

Fabian Bergès-Sennou*, Frédéric Loss**, Estelle Malavolti** and Thibaud Vergé

*INRA-ESR and Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse
**GREMAQ and Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse

The European Commission recently considered abolishing the notification system and focusing on a regime of ex post investigations.

Our objective is to show that a better understanding of markets can justify this reform. When the precision of the competition authority's analysis is not high enough, an ex ante control, like the notification system, is preferable. On the other hand, if the decision accuracy improves, an ex post investigation regime achieves a higher social welfare.

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