Working paper 05/132 - Abstract

Transparency, Recuitment and Retention in the Public Sector (PDF, file 1516 KB) (PDF, 1,515kB)

Gian Luigi Albano and Clare Leaver

Although performance measurement systems are likely to have significant recruitment and retention consequences these have received much less attention that the individual incentive effects. This paper explores these recruitment and retention consequences in organizations, such as those in the public sector, which are characterized by rigidities in pay. We clarify when performance measurement increases the cost of recruiting and retaining public sector employees and when it does not. Within the same framework, we also show that traditional practices such as tenure based pay and ports of entry can be rationalized as an optimal response to rigidities in pay.

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