Leverhulme Trust logo

ESRC logo

Twitter logo

Working paper 03/081

Traits, Imitation and Evolutionary Dynamics (PDF, file 364 KB)

Wendelin Schnedler

In this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reflect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the resulting dynamics are a multivariate stochastic process. An example for such a process is simulated. The results resemble the replicator dynamics to a remarkable degree. If traits moderately depend on the past, this accelerates convergence of the dynamics towards a stable state. If the dependence is strong, the stable state is not reached.

Note: some of the documents on this page are in PDF format. In order to view a PDF you will need Adobe Acrobat Reader