Virtual Seminar in Economic Theory

Speaker: Daniel Clark (UCLA)

Title: "Partially Informed Disclosure" with Kai Hao Yang.

Format: Virtual

Abstract: We develop a framework for studying information disclosure by a privately and partially informed sender that nests several existing models, such as those of standard information design or simple evidence disclosure games, and facilitates analysis of many settings of interest that are outside of the scope of these existing models. We characterize the sets of equilibria in various environments, study properties of equilibria, and show that certain findings from existing models of information disclosure do not generally extend to settings with privately and imperfectly informed senders. For instance, in many environments of interest, (1) the outcomes that would be selected by standard information design are not consistent with equilibrium in our setup, and (2) models in which the principal is perfectly informed about the state before disclosure would predict full unraveling, namely the state being revealed to the agent with probability 1 in every equilibrium, while full unraveling is much less robust with imperfectly informed senders. We relate our results to phenomena in activities such as advertising.

Organisers: Julia and Francesco

For more information, please contact the organisers.